The series "Signs and Metaculture" ended up being a bit too dry to appeal to any readers whatsoever, or at least to those who might be reading blogs like mine. And let's face it, no one is going to stumble on my blog unless they are googling "metaculture". Originally, the series was meant to explore differing aspects of representation through literary devices and terminology. For example, the word "Sign" was the first and I discussed how there were differing opinions on how "Sign" could be interpreted.
The second word I wanted to discuss was the word "Mimesis", a word that obviously lends toward the same meaning as "mime", that is, to imitate. Many philosophers and theorists (from Plato to Erich Auerbach, to Michael Taussig) have come to the conclusion that reality is formed by the imitating of other things.
However, the word Mimesis does not only mean "to imitate" in the sense of a re-telling, rather, it means to actualize and participate in the thingness of the object or idea being represented. In this sense, all cultures, all images, all words, essentially everything, participates together in reinterpreting and taking part in those things which came before.
I hope to delve more into this idea of representation in the future with more or less boring content, but it will be interspersed with other random things. If you have anything to contribute to the site (my wife said she can't read white on black, but I like it), let me know. While you have time on your hands, check out this odd fella.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Friday, March 13, 2009
Unpredictably Irregular Poetry Exposure #1
This thing, that hath a code and not a core,
Hath set acquaintance where might be affections,
And nothing now,
Disturbeth his reflections.
-Ezra Pound
Hath set acquaintance where might be affections,
And nothing now,
Disturbeth his reflections.
-Ezra Pound
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Welcome
This is a continuation of my participation in the effort of the former Ante-Occidents. Many posts found here are from that site. I hope to begin posting with more regularity. If the color scheme or content is bothersome, let me know soon. This blog I hope to make more "personal" than the last and less overtly intellectual. Most of this is due to my being out of school for the time being, but it also has to do with the lack of time. I don't have as much time to read or think now that I am quite busy with this job. Feel free to peruse the old posts until I come up with new ones.
The Active in the Making
Schopenhauer says in his first part of "The World as Will and Representation" that to consider the object as separate and prior to the subject is a false assumption. Indeed, the object comes simultaneously with the subject yet "presupposes" it.
So what the hell is he talking about? Basically this, the object is the representation of the subject, and yet exists as the very subject itself in its entirety. That is to say, the representation of a thing contains the thing in its fullness. Why? Because, according to the Schop, objects exist because of the active will of the subject; subjects exist as continuous emanations and participations in ACTIVE will.
In a painting (or some of my friends here might think of an icon), the image is said to represent something. Yet, Schopenhauer claims that that representation contains the fullness of the thing represented. Why? Because both the original subject and the representation of it both exist because of the same emanation of will. Because neither the subject nor object can exist without being active separately and active in their participation with each other (object drawing from the will of the subject and vice versa), the subject is pure action exertive and the object is pure action receptive.
Here is the problem: understanding. I have not yet read enough of the Schop to know what he thinks of when he says "understanding", but I do know that the knowledge of the existence of the subject fully within the object representing it presupposes an understanding of the subject itself. The issue here is that Schopenhauer clearly points out that all subjects are pure energia and no essence. Those in the Eastern side of the world would say that this cannot be, as one can never understand God outside of his energies, his actions. In other words, his fullness, his "being" as Schopenhauer calls it, cannot be known by man. While Schopenhauer gets a lot of points very close to the mark, I believe here is one where he goes a bit to the far side of his point. Yet, my problem is that I have not yet come up with a philosophical argument, though I know someone else already has and I just haven't read it, to counterpoint the argument for pure energy as being!
If I can figure out a simple way of explaining it, maybe I will apply it to my gradually forming definition of the "making" of words. What I have so far is this: in creation, everything is always in motion; the motion defined here is constant movement of the active will in supporting objects (or representations); words themselves are nothing but representations of the subjects (thoughts, physical things, images, etc.); language is made up of words; thus language is constantly subjected to the active supporting will of the subject. Conundrum: two opposing subjects actively projecting their individual wills upon the same phrase, thus creating opposing representations out of identical objects. The solution is not always that there is a faulty premise in one speaker's projection.
Well, I will leave it at that for today.
So what the hell is he talking about? Basically this, the object is the representation of the subject, and yet exists as the very subject itself in its entirety. That is to say, the representation of a thing contains the thing in its fullness. Why? Because, according to the Schop, objects exist because of the active will of the subject; subjects exist as continuous emanations and participations in ACTIVE will.
In a painting (or some of my friends here might think of an icon), the image is said to represent something. Yet, Schopenhauer claims that that representation contains the fullness of the thing represented. Why? Because both the original subject and the representation of it both exist because of the same emanation of will. Because neither the subject nor object can exist without being active separately and active in their participation with each other (object drawing from the will of the subject and vice versa), the subject is pure action exertive and the object is pure action receptive.
Here is the problem: understanding. I have not yet read enough of the Schop to know what he thinks of when he says "understanding", but I do know that the knowledge of the existence of the subject fully within the object representing it presupposes an understanding of the subject itself. The issue here is that Schopenhauer clearly points out that all subjects are pure energia and no essence. Those in the Eastern side of the world would say that this cannot be, as one can never understand God outside of his energies, his actions. In other words, his fullness, his "being" as Schopenhauer calls it, cannot be known by man. While Schopenhauer gets a lot of points very close to the mark, I believe here is one where he goes a bit to the far side of his point. Yet, my problem is that I have not yet come up with a philosophical argument, though I know someone else already has and I just haven't read it, to counterpoint the argument for pure energy as being!
If I can figure out a simple way of explaining it, maybe I will apply it to my gradually forming definition of the "making" of words. What I have so far is this: in creation, everything is always in motion; the motion defined here is constant movement of the active will in supporting objects (or representations); words themselves are nothing but representations of the subjects (thoughts, physical things, images, etc.); language is made up of words; thus language is constantly subjected to the active supporting will of the subject. Conundrum: two opposing subjects actively projecting their individual wills upon the same phrase, thus creating opposing representations out of identical objects. The solution is not always that there is a faulty premise in one speaker's projection.
Well, I will leave it at that for today.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Aesthetics and Associated Mental Humbug
Recently I have been quite busy with the move, new job, and strangely uncharacteristic attempts to become slightly more organized. Because of this, I have tried to lay off much of my self-applied pressure to continue regular posting. However, each night as I lay down to sleep, certain thoughts persist in preventing me from doing so, no matter how tired I may be. As these thoughts, though they are in no way formalized, pertain to the general strain of thought displayed in my postings (sans the Olympics babble), I will do my best to hash them out in a semi-understandable format.
Point one of my basic ponderings is the idea of instability in human nature. Perhaps it is an effect of my naiveté, but I have rarely thought of human nature as being transient at best. Yet Gregory of Nyssa writes, “Existence itself originates in change” and, “The created nature cannot exist without change.” This, of course, is because “nothing comes from nothing” and things came to be as a result of change (a point upon which all people agree, whether ex nihilo or from preexisting matter, all things begin as change, hence “begin”, not just “be”). And, according to Newtonian Laws (Chase correct me if I’m wrong), things in motion tend to stay in motion (though these laws do not necessarily apply to metaphysics, accept the allegory). Thus, to approach a study of human nature, or the nature of anything created or deriving from a created thing, one must approach it with the concept of constant motion. Though I already had thought that language was constantly changing (though not evolving), my thoughts have been much involved with how much different things (language in particular) change in reaction to things or in action towards them, or a combination, or whatever (very Hegelian I know).
As you can tell, my thoughts are very scattered and incomplete, but my next point is along the same lines: all of my “Signs and Metaculture” series was supposed to pertain to the representation of things (examining words like Metaphor, Mimesis, Ekphrasis, maybe Reification, etc.) yet I have also recently discovered Theodor Adorno’s “Aesthetic Theory” and can’t help but look for everything to have an inherent contradiction, vis-à-vis, “Art can only be understood by its laws of movement, not according to any invariants. It is defined by its relation to what it is not.” Of course, I know next to nothing about aesthetic theory (having read little of Kant, less of Hegel, and maybe 30 pages of Nietzsche, without tapping much into the 20th century at all), but Adorno’s desire to describe the relation of Art to society, determining in the process that Art is neither the sublimation of society alone nor the mere representation of it, convinces me that Language and signs, in their act of representation, may perhaps participate in the same particular fluidity to which human nature is subject. Though none of this plays out empirically, I am trying to process the relation between the necessarily human act of “making” that I promised to discuss, and the reflection of the transient nature of the “maker”.
Lastly, I put forth a call to anyone who can suggest further reading on “Ekphrasis”, as I can find very little on it and don’t have access to university thinkers right now.
Until I can figure out a regular schedule, I remain yours, my 2 ½ faithful readers!
Point one of my basic ponderings is the idea of instability in human nature. Perhaps it is an effect of my naiveté, but I have rarely thought of human nature as being transient at best. Yet Gregory of Nyssa writes, “Existence itself originates in change” and, “The created nature cannot exist without change.” This, of course, is because “nothing comes from nothing” and things came to be as a result of change (a point upon which all people agree, whether ex nihilo or from preexisting matter, all things begin as change, hence “begin”, not just “be”). And, according to Newtonian Laws (Chase correct me if I’m wrong), things in motion tend to stay in motion (though these laws do not necessarily apply to metaphysics, accept the allegory). Thus, to approach a study of human nature, or the nature of anything created or deriving from a created thing, one must approach it with the concept of constant motion. Though I already had thought that language was constantly changing (though not evolving), my thoughts have been much involved with how much different things (language in particular) change in reaction to things or in action towards them, or a combination, or whatever (very Hegelian I know).
As you can tell, my thoughts are very scattered and incomplete, but my next point is along the same lines: all of my “Signs and Metaculture” series was supposed to pertain to the representation of things (examining words like Metaphor, Mimesis, Ekphrasis, maybe Reification, etc.) yet I have also recently discovered Theodor Adorno’s “Aesthetic Theory” and can’t help but look for everything to have an inherent contradiction, vis-à-vis, “Art can only be understood by its laws of movement, not according to any invariants. It is defined by its relation to what it is not.” Of course, I know next to nothing about aesthetic theory (having read little of Kant, less of Hegel, and maybe 30 pages of Nietzsche, without tapping much into the 20th century at all), but Adorno’s desire to describe the relation of Art to society, determining in the process that Art is neither the sublimation of society alone nor the mere representation of it, convinces me that Language and signs, in their act of representation, may perhaps participate in the same particular fluidity to which human nature is subject. Though none of this plays out empirically, I am trying to process the relation between the necessarily human act of “making” that I promised to discuss, and the reflection of the transient nature of the “maker”.
Lastly, I put forth a call to anyone who can suggest further reading on “Ekphrasis”, as I can find very little on it and don’t have access to university thinkers right now.
Until I can figure out a regular schedule, I remain yours, my 2 ½ faithful readers!
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